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THE LONG ARM OF MONTANA'S RULE 4B: DUE
PROCESS LIMITS TO THE EXERCISE OF
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
William A. Rossbach
In two recent Montana federal district court cases, the courts
reached opposite conclusions about the exercise of jurisdiction
under Montana's "long-arm" rule' even though the nonresidents
had similar contacts with persons in Montana. In both cases, the
defendants had never been physically present in Montana prior to
suit; they had no offices or agents in the state; and their only con-
tacts with the state were telephone conversations with persons in
Montana through which they negotiated single business transac-
tions.
In the first case, Friberg v. Schlenske,2 the court found that the
nonresidents did nothing which would make litigation foreseeable in
Montana, such that subjecting them to jurisdiction violated the
fairness required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Johnson Flying
Service, Inc. v. Mackey International, Inc. ,' because the nonresident
corporation had allegedly made fraudulent representations to plain-
tiffs in Montana, the court found that the defendant's activity met
the statutory requisites and concluded that due process would not
be violated by holding the defendant answerable in Montana courts.
I. DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
To permit an adjudication that is binding on a person not pres-
ent within its boundaries, a state must first have statutorily pro-
vided the means of subjecting that person to its jurisdiction. If the
defendant's acts satisfy the statutes, the state's courts must deter-
mine whether the application of the long-arm statute to the facts
of a particular controversy satisfies the due process standards of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Due process demands that before a state
court may adjudicate a controversy involving a nonresident party,
the party must have notice of the proceedings against it,4 an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and some nexus with the state making it reason-
1. MONT. R. CIV. P. 4B.
2. 32 St. Rptr. 678 (D. Mont. 1975).
3. 32 St. Rptr. 879 (D. Mont. 1975).
4. The notice requirement is to ensure that a reasonable effort under the circumstances
has been made to apprise the defendant of the nature of the proceedings against him. The
Supreme Court has said that for notice to be reasonable "[tihe means employed must be
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish
it." Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
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able to allow the courts of that state to make a binding judgment
on the party.'
The test courts most often employ to decide jurisdiction ques-
tions is the "minimum contacts" test first announced in
International Shoe Company v. Washington.' Briefly stated, a court
may assert its jurisdiction if it finds that the nonresident has enough
contact with the forum that making it defend there does not violate
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 7 So
vaguely stated, the test has limited utility. However, in
International Shoe the court elaborated by enunciating certain
yardsticks to measure the assertion of jurisdiction.' When a person
partakes of the privilege of conducting activities within a state, he
takes on certain reciprocal obligations to respond to suits arising out
of his activities there. As a result, the courts of that state have
specific jurisdiction over a person to litigate those controversies di-
rectly arising out of his activities in that state.'
Courts attempting to apply the "fair play" doctrine have strug-
gled to create analytical schemes for examining the particular facts
of each case. In L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries,
Inc.,1' the Ninth Circuit approved a three step approach" to deter-
5. R.J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 71 (1971).
6. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7. Id.
8. In the opinion, the Court said that:
to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that State. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue. 326 U.S. at 319.
9. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1961). The Supreme Court foreshadowed these theories of reciprocal
obligations and specific jurisdiction in an earlier decision in which it found a nonresident
defendant to be subject to the jurisdiction of a state where he had injured another because
his multi-state activities necessarily involved the risk of harm to the state's citizens. As such,
he could expect to defend himself for the consequences of his activities there. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The Court later held that jurisdiction over a nonresident "who
sets in motion in one State the means by which injury was inflicted in another" was not
inconsistent with the requirements of due process. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933).
Later decisions reinforced these doctrines. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Hanson v. Denchla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Although McGee seemed to allow almost unlimited
jurisdiction over a nonresident who had any incidental contacts with the forum state, the
Court in Hanson clarified its conception of due process in jurisdiction cases by requiring that
the nonresident voluntarily engage in some conduct by which it "purposely avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." [Emphasis added] 357 U.S. at 253.
10. 265 F.2d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 1959).
11. This three step approach, drawn from a combined reading of Supreme Court deci-
sions, first appeared in Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on a Single
Act: A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEORGETOWN L.J. 342, 351-52 (1958).
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mine whether a court's exercise of jurisdiction exceeded due process
limits.
The Sixth Circuit summarized that approach:
First, the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege
of acting in the forum or causing consequences in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activi-
ties there.
Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the
defendant must have substantial enough connection with the
forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant
reasonable.2
II. JOHNSON FLYING SERVICE, INC. V. MACKEY INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In Johnson Flying Service, Inc., the plaintiff, a Montana corpo-
ration needing a Twin Otter airplane which met government stan-
dards of airworthiness, engaged in a series of telephone conversa-
tions with agents of Mackey International in Florida and New York
about a plane that Mackey wanted to sublease. During those con-
versations Mackey allegedly made certain representations about the
condition of the plane which induced Johnson to enter into an agree-
ment to sublease the plane. Johnson's chief pilot went to Florida to
test the plane, execute the contract, and take delivery. He flew the
plane back to Montana where, after a few flights, problems with the
engine became evident. A Twin Otter specialist tested the plane and
determined that it was not airworthy and that the condition had
existed prior to the execution of the sublease. Johnson then brought
suit in Montana to recover substantial damages resulting from the
allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations.
A. Purposeful Act Requirement
The threshold step in the three step L.D. Reeder scheme has
two significant elements: (1) purpose and (2) an act or consequences
of an act in the forum. Mackey resisted jurisdiction, claiming that
it had never been physically present in the forum prior to the agree-
ment and that its contacts with Montana were merely incidental
and not purposeful because Johnson had initiated the negotia-
tions. 3 However, Mackey purposefully engaged in a national solici-
12. Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
Similar approaches have been approved in at least two other circuits. Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 352-3 (5th Cir. 1966) (Rives, J. concurring); see Altanese v. Econ-
omy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73
Ill. App.2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1966). In Montana, three of the four federal judges have
recognized and approved the approach. Continental Oil Co. v. Atwood & Morril Co., 265 F.
Supp. 692, 696 (D. Mont. 1967) (Jameson, C.J.; Murray, J.; Smith, J.).
13. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court ignored the issue of
[Vol. 37
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tation for the sublease. Whenever one of Mackey's leased planes
became surplus, the owner of the plane acted as Mackey's agent to
secure a sublessee. In this instance, the owner contacted an interna-
tional aircraft broker named Dexter. Dexter, whose commission was
paid by Mackey, placed an advertisement in a national trade publi-
cation offering the Twin Otter for lease. In response to this adver-
tisement, Johnson began negotiations with the various agents of
Mackey.
Although Mackey argued that it did no act while physically in
the state, other courts have had little trouble finding that threshold
step satisfied when a nonresident sends representations into the
state by telephone or through advertisements intending them to be
relied on there. 4 Jurisdiction is grounded on the nonresident's in-
tent to induce the plaintiff's reliance on those representations.
Where a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false statement,
intending that it should be relied on to the injury of a resident of
that state he has for jurisdictional purposes acted within that
state. 5
New communications media allow persons to be "electronically
present"'" in another state, at least for the purpose of perpetrating
initiative. Federal courts have generally downplayed the importance of that issue. A Circuit
Court of Appeals likened the situation of nonresident defendants such as Mackey to the
maker of the better mousetrap; an out-of-state corporation which is fortunate to be able to
distribute its product nationally without leaving its home state may not thereby evade the
consequences of its activities. Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102, 104 (4th Cir. 1962).
The factual differences between McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), illustrate the distinction between incidental and purposeful
contact with a state. In McGee, the nonresident insurer had no other business in California,
but when it assumed the obligations of another insurer it mailed an offer to the plaintiff to
insure him in accordance with the terms of his previous policy. With the acceptance of the
offer, the insurer acquired a legally enforceable right in that state. In Hanson, the nonresident
trustee's connection with the state of Florida was entirely an incident of the settlor's moving
her domicile to that state. The trustee's legally enforceable rights were acquired before the
settlor entered the state. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the suit could "not be
said to be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in
Florida." 357 U.S. at 252.
14. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a nonresident may have sufficient
contact with the forum state to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process even
though he was never physically present. Eg. Traveler's Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950). Federal courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court, have based jurisdiction on a
wide variety of nonphysical contacts. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.
1967) (sending newspapers into state); WSAZ, Inc., v. Lyons, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir.
1958)(radio broadcasts). In fraud cases particularly, courts have had little trouble justifying
their assertion of jurisdiction over persons not physically present. Haddad v. Lewis, 382 F.
Supp. 1365 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Jeno's Inc. v. Tupman Thurlow Co., 349 F. Supp. 1185 (D.
Minn. 1972); McDermott v. Bremson, 273 Minn. 104, 139 N.W.2d 809 (1966); Kiefer v. May,
46 Mich. App. 566, 208 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). Contra, Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d
27, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900, 215 N.E.2d 159 (1966).
15. Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972).
16. McGraw v. Matthei, 340 F. Supp. 162, 164 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
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a fraud upon that state's citizens. Another court has held that "in
view of the particular tort [fraud] . ..a single material represen-
tation which was relied upon may be sufficient contact with [the
state] to allow courts here to exercise jurisdiction. . . .,17 In
Murphy v. Erwin- Wasey, Inc.," relied on in Johnson Flying Service,
Inc., the court drew an analogy between fraud and products liability
cases: sending material misrepresentations to be relied on in the
state evidences a purpose similar to that of a manufacturer sending
a defective product into the state for economic gain." The nonresi-
dent corporation's intentional placement of its product into the
stream of commerce justifies the court's assertion of power over it.
Mackey intended no general product distribution, but it was its
custom when aircraft became surplus to employ leasing agents to
advertise the availability of the plane and seek a sublease agree-
ment wherever possible. The purposefulness of Mackey's activities
within Montana is even greater than in a products liability case
because a defective product may be generally distributed in inter-
state commerce, merely creating the opportunity for later damage,
whereas Mackey knowingly sent statements into the forum state
intending that they be relied upon and acted upon there.
B. Specific Jurisdiction Requirement
The second step in the three step L.D. Reeder scheme embodies
the doctrine of specific jurisdiction.20 Traditionally jurisdiction
cases were categorized as in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.2
Once jurisdiction had been obtained the court could adjudicate any
controversy involving the person or the subject matter, even claims
having no relationship to the state. The doctrine of specific jurisdic-
tion allows a new category of cases in which a court obtains jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident only for suits arising out of his single act or
the consequences of that act within the forum state.
Jurisdiction statutes enacted since International Shoe have in-
corporated the doctrine of specific jurisdiction.2 The Montana Rule
17. Haddad v. Lewis, 382 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
18. 460 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972).
19. Federal courts in Montana have asserted jurisdiction over nonresident manufactur-
ers to adjudicate disputes arising out of allegedly defective manufacture of products causing
injury in Montana. Scanlan v. Norma Projektil Fabrik, 345 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mont. 1972);
Hartung v. Washington Iron Works, 267 F, Supp. 408 (D. Mont. 1967); Continental Oil Co.
v. Atwood & Morril, 265 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mont. 1967); Bullard v. Rhodes Pharmacal, 263 F.
Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1967).
20. See discussion supra note 9.
21. See generally, R.J. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, at 65.
22. See Note, Jurisdiction Over a Nonresident Corporation Based on a Single Act: A
New Sole for International Shoe, supra note 11 at 368.
[Vol. 37
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4B does so implicitly. 23 Activity which does not fall under the provi-
sions of Rule 4B also does not meet the requisites of the second step
of the L.D. Reeder scheme. In Johnson Flying Service, Inc., Mackey
contacted the forum through a series of telephone negotiations from
which the lawsuit arose. Thus the action arose out the tort of fraud
and both the accrual of a tort provision of Montana Rule 4B1 and
the second step of the L.D. Reeder scheme were satisfied.
C. The Reasonableness Requirement
The third and most critical step in the L.D. Reeder scheme
demands that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant be
reasonable. Reasonableness and fairness in a court's assertion of
power to adjudicate a controversy is the "conceptual core" of due
process.25 The nature and extent of the nonresident's nexus with the
state determines how fair and reasonable that assertion is.2" A
state's courts base their interest in adjudicating a given controversy
upon the consequences within the state of the non-resident's activ-
ity. 7 The United States Supreme Court gives "great weight" in
jurisdiction cases to the in-state economic consequences of a trans-
action and the degree of interest that state has in providing its
citizens with a forum to see that transaction carried out." When a
23. The pertinent language from Rule 4B states that any person is subject to jurisdic-
tion for "any claim for relief arising from the doing personally" of an act included within the
enumerated categories of conduct. MONT. R. Civ. P. 4B.
24. MONT. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(b). The language which provides for jurisdiction over any
act resulting in the "accrual of a tort" in Montana is unique. Other long-arm statutes use
language such as "tortious act". Eg. SMITH-HURD ILL. ANNOT. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(1)(b).
25. R.J. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5 at 69. Professor Kurland has criticized the terms fair
play and reasonableness as statements of conclusion rather than of reasoning. Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 623 (1958). For those courts which dismiss jurisdiction issues with
single sentence, peremptory statements, that criticism is justified. Nonetheless, those terms
remain the principal standards courts use. What those terms mean, however, has evolved
considerably. Courts view each new fact situation which comes before them and reason by
analogy to prior precedent, taking into consideration the evolution in the national economy
and interstate communications networks, to incrementally expand the scope of their power
over nonresidents.
26. Professor Currie emphasized there is no "magic formula" which a*court should use
in evaluating the fairness of jurisdiction. He points to a number of factors which weigh upon
a court's calculation of fairness: initiative or solicitation, the nature of the businesses of the
litigants, the presence of agents in the forum state, the relative abilities of the parties to
defend in a foreign court, and in a contract action the place of performance. Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F.
533, 577. Other authorities have cited the location of witnesses and proof, Von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 8 at 1168; and whether the person invoking jurisdiction was buyer or
seller, Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 1969).
27. Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 385 (6th Cir. 1968).
Currie, supra note 26 at 565; Scoles, Oregon Conflicts: Three Cases, 49 ORE. L. REV. 273, 280
(1970).
28. Traveler's Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (citing Hoopeston
6
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defendant's activities have substantial economic impact in another
state, that state's interest outweighs any possible inconveniences to
the defendant forced to litigate there." Jurisdiction is not unfair
because the nonresident should have reasonably foreseen the possi-
bility of suit where the impact of his activities falls.3
A defendant who engages in a form of business which entails con-
duct likely to create liability and has substantial economic
consequences within a state may reasonably be required to resolve
a resulting legal dispute in that state. [Emphasis added] 3'
Mackey argued that it could not reasonably be subjected to
jurisdiction when its only contacts with the state were telephone
calls and nothing it did through those calls made litigation foreseea-
ble. In an early case applying Rule 4B, the Montana supreme court
implicitly recognized that under the broad terms of that rule, juris-
diction could reasonably be based upon telephone calls alone .32 The
court subsequently used the accrual of a tort provision of the rule
to find jurisdiction over an action involving a contract with a non-
resident which the plaintiff partially negotiated and finally ac-
cepted while he was in the state.33 The court found that the com-
plaint sounded in tort, and if there was a tort committed, it was
committed in Montana, even though the defendant had never been
in the state. 34
The court in Johnson Flying Service, Inc. used somewhat
similar reasoning, resting its decision upon the nature of the claim
in controversy. 31 It was not unreasonable or unfair to subject
Mackey to jurisdiction for claims arising out of allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentations made by phone to Johnson and relied upon to
its detriment here. As the court pointed out:
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)).
29. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 356 U.S. 220, 223-4 (1957). In accord with the
concept of reciprocal obligations enunciated by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) is the principle that part of the cost of doing business
for economic gain in a foreign state is being subjected to that state's courts' power. "[T]he
conduit of economic benefit affords the means of enforcing economic responsibility to the
plaintiff." H. GooDIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 130 (4th ed. 1964).
30. It is not unfair to subject a nonresident to jurisdiction when its activities have a
"realistic impact on the commerce of the state" and it should have "reasonably foreseen that
transaction would have consequences in that state." Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus.
Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 382-3 (6th Cir. 1968).
31. Scoles, supra note 30 at 277.
32. Prentice Lumber Co. v. Spahn, 156 Mont. 68, 474 P.2d 141 (1970). The court used
the transacting business provision of Rule 4B to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident, relying primarily on the Oregon supreme court decision, State ex rel. White
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968), which based jurisdiction
solely on telephone negotiations.
33. State ex rel. Goff v. District Court, 157 Mont. 495, 487 P.2d 292, 294 (1971).
34. Id.
35. 32 St. Rptr. 879, 882 (1975).
[Vol. 37
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In cases of fraud, the relevant events inhere in the negotiations and
the making of the contract, including all the representations in-
ducing agreement. [Footnote omitted],
If the act of reliance on the misrepresentations is the proximate
cause of damage to the plaintiff, then the place where reliance oc-
curred, where plaintiff parted with his assets, is the place of wrong,
not where the representations were made. A Although conflicts of law
doctrines are not strictly applicable to jurisdiction decisions, they
are often useful in evaluating where a tort occurred and for measur-
ing state interest." According to conflicts doctrines, pecuniary loss
is more difficult to locate than physical injury. However, it is
usually of greatest concern to the state with which the person suffer-
ing the loss has the closest relationship. 9
The state's interest in protecting its citizens from fraud means
that Mackey could have reasonably anticipated suit if the plane
failed to perform as represented. No matter how the representation
arrived in the state, if the sending party should have reasonably
anticipated contractual consequences and reliance in the state, then
it is not unfair to subject the nonresident to jurisdiction for claims
arising out of that transaction. 0
1II. FRIBERG V. SCHLENSKE
In Friberg v. Schlenske, the plaintiff, a Utah artist, had deliv-
ered to defendant Schlenske four paintings on consignment. Alleg-
edly, Schlenske, without authority, pledged the paintings to secure
loans from two Great Falls banks. The banks later foreclosed the
pledges. Schlenske then called one of the nonresidents, a Texas art
dealer, to try to sell the paintings for the bank. After a series of
telephone calls, the paintings were shipped to Texas for approval.
After they accepted the paintings, the Texas defendants sent a
check to Montana to cover the purchase price. Plaintiff brought suit
in Montana to recover the paintings or their value.
There are a number of similarities between this case and
Johnson Flying Service, Inc. The Texas defendants had no agents
in the state and no dealings with the state except for telephone
negotiations leading to their purchase of the paintings. The negotia-
36. Id.
37. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377, note 4 (1934).
38. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958); Van Mehren & Tra'iman, supra
note 8 at 1129.
39. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (SECOND) § 148, comment c (1971). See also
Note, Conflict of Laws in Multi-State Fraud and Deceit, 3 VAND. L. REV. 767 (1950).
40. See e.g., Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 494 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1974) and fraud cases
cited supra note 15.
19761
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tions constituted purposeful acts within the forum state, and the
alleged tort of conversion arose out of those negotiations. Yet, in
Friberg the court rejected jurisdiction over the nonresidents.
The Friberg decision quotes language which expressly recog-
nizes the three step L.D. Reeder approach." The court emphasized,
however, that it is the third step, the due process requirement of
fairness, which is ultimately determinative. The court's finding that
fair play was violated rested on two general grounds: (1) the Texas
defendants were not engaged in any multi-state business which en-
tailed solicitation in Montana and (2) their conduct in Texas was
not such that they should have reasonably foreseen the possibility
of litigation in Montana.2
Again, fairness determinations rest on the character and
foreseeability of the consequences which the nonresident's acts have
in the forum. The Texas defendants were buyers, not sellers, of
goods. Although they voluntarily engaged in a transaction with per-
sons in Montana, their conduct lacked the purposefulness of
Mackey, who placed advertisements in a national publication. Al-
though Mackey had no general interstate product distribution, it
customarily subleased planes through interstate brokers when its
equipment became surplus. In contrast, the Texas defendants were
sought out by the sellers in Montana, and the defendants' Montana
transaction was not a part of any multi-state business dealings.
Further, their conduct in Texas had little or no foreseeable
impact in Montana. Whereas Mackey could expect litigation if its
plane did not perform to the standards represented, the Texas de-
fendants promptly paid the price of the paintings and did nothing
else which would have made litigation in Montana foreseeable. The
Texas defendants had no contact with the plaintiff. Given the na-
ture of their activities, the limited impact in Montana, and the
unforeseeability of litigation, the court properly refused to exercise
its power over those defendants.
In a footnote to the opinion, the court recognized that the "fair
play" question turns on foreseeability.4 3 If the defendants had not
paid for the paintings, then litigation would have been foreseeable
and jurisdiction not unreasonable. As it was, they paid for the paint-
ings from Texas, and the tort they were alleged to have committed,
conversion, would have occurred, if at all, in Texas, not Montana.
Jurisdiction is not intended as punishment for the faults of the
defendant; it is grounded upon the state's interest in providing a
41. 32 St. Rptr. 678, 678-9 (D. Mont. 1975) (citing Aylstock v. Mayo Foundation, 341
F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Mont. 1972)).
42. Id. at 679.
43. Id. at 679, n.1.
[Vol. 37
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forum for its residents." However, the state has no interest in bring-
ing nonresidents into its courts to litigate a controversy which was
not reasonably foreseeable by the nonresident. At this point, juris-
diction questions merge with tort concepts of the "prudent man".
Due process fairness and civil negligence both depend upon the
court finding that the party should have foreseen the consequences
of its activities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
International Shoe, state and federal district courts have expanded
their jurisdiction over an increasingly broad range of contacts that
nonresident defendants have with the forum state. The Supreme
Court has upheld that expansion because the "fundamental trans-
formation of our national economy", coupled with advances in com-
munication systems, has lessened the burden on the nonresident to
defend himself in a state where he has engaged in economic activ-
ity.4" It is incumbent upon state legislatures and courts to recognize
the greater interstate character of the national economy and accept
the need for expanded jurisdiction.46
Commentators have heralded the Montana long-arm rule as
one of the broadest of any state,47 reaching to the outer limits al-
lowed by the United States Constitution. The Montana legislature
has apparently made the policy decision that expanded jurisdiction
is necessary for the protection of its citizens. The people of Montana
are largely dependent upon foreign production of finished goods;
thus the state has a substantial interest in providing a forum for
redress of injury to its citizens from such products. Without a rela-
tively broad rule, liberally construed, the citizens of the state would
be forced to pursue out-of-state manufacturers to their domicile
state. As a result, in many cases the out-of-state manufacturers
would be able to gain economic advantage from transactions with
citizens of the state without any responsibility for resulting injury
because of the inconvenience of following the defendant to its domi-
cile. As long as the nonresident's activities were such that the in-
state consequences made the possibility of litigation reasonably
foreseeable, there is no violation of due process to require them to
defend themselves in a foreign tribunal.
44. Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 1968).
45. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 356 U.S. 220, 222-3 (1957).
46. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) ("the need for jurisdiction over
nonresidents has undergone a similar increase".).
47. Towe, Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents and Montana's New Rule 4B, 24
MONT. L. REV. 3, 22 (1961). See also, Boit v. Emmco, Inc. Co., 271 F.Supp. 366, 370 (D. Mont.
1967); Prentice Lumber Co. v. Spahn, 156 Mont. 68, 474 P.2d 141, 144-5 (1970).
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